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A. Introduction – the notion of ‘EEA Courts’ 
 
To most Norwegian lawyers, the term ‘the two EEA Courts’ would probably be understood as 
a reference to the EFTA Court and the Supreme Court of Norway rather than, as suggested 
here, to the EFTA Court and ECJ. The understanding of the ECJ as not only an EU but also an 
EEA Court of Justice has only slowly sunk in to the Norwegian legal community.2 However, 
not least due to the somewhat troubling prospects to the free movement of capital in the EEA 
offered by the ECJ’s application of Article 40 EEA in a recent string of cases,3 appreciation of 
the ECJ as the gatekeeper for market operators from the EFTA States seeking judicial protec-
tion in the EU appears to gain ground: If the ECJ embarks on an interpretation of EEA law 
which differs from its own interpretation of corresponding provisions of EU law, the result 
will be gradual undermining of the Agreements overall goal to extend the internal market to 
include the EFTA States. Thus, the fate of the EEA Agreement at long last hangs on its 
continued acceptance by the ECJ. 
Even acknowledging that the ECJ is to be understood as an EEA Court, most 
Norwegian lawyers would probably argue that this raises the number of EEA Courts to three – 
the Supreme Court of Norway, the EFTA Court and the ECJ.4 A recent survey of the applica-
tion of EEA law in Norwegian courts 1994-2010 has revealed that lower Norwegian courts 
indeed do appear to see the Supreme Court as an EEA Court proper, taking its decisions into 
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 Readers with command of Norwegian should be warned at the outset that this contribution draws heavily upon 
the more extensive account in the author’s report ‘EU/EØS-rett i norske domstoler’ [EU/EEA law in Norwegian 
Courts], Report commissioned by the Norwegian EEA Review Committee, Oslo 2011. Still, the present context 
allows some additional comments de lege ferenda, see, in particular, infra section B.IV.  
2
 See Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, ‘The EFTA Court 15 Years On’ (2010) 59 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 731-760, at p. 734. 
3
 See Cases C-540/07 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-10983; C-72/09 Établissements Rimbaud, judgment of 
28 October 2010 (nyr); C-436/08 Haribo and Salinen, judgment of 10 February 2011 (nyr) and C-267/09 
Commission v Portugal, judgment of 5 May 2011 (nyr) as well as the pending cases C-493/09 Commission v 
Portugal and C-48/11 Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö v A Oy. 
4
 Obviously, this is a very Norwegian perspective, to which Icelandic and Liechtenstein lawyers would not ap-
prove. Acknowledging this, the national perspective would inevitably lead to an increase in number of EEA 
Courts to seven – the EFTA Court, the ECJ, the Supreme Court of Iceland, the Supreme Court of Norway and 
the three Liechtenstein courts of last instance (the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court and the 
Constitutional Court). 
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account when interpreting EEA rules.5 Even though there do seem to be greatly diverging 
opinions amongst the judges of the lower courts as to the authority of Supreme Court prece-
dents in the field of EEA law, EEA-related decisions of the Supreme Court are frequently 
cited and followed.  
Some support for this approach may arguably be inferred from Article 106 EEA, 
where the Courts of last instance of the EFTA States are included together with the EFTA 
Court and the ECJ in the system of exchange of EEA relevant court decisions intended to 
achieve the objective of homogeneity.6 The Norwegian Supreme Court may further invoke its 
constitutional role as the supreme judicial authority of Norway (Articles 88 and 90 of the 
Norwegian Constitution), which again is reflected in the fact that Article 34 SCA7 entails no 
obligation to refer unresolved questions of EEA law to the EFTA Court and, further, makes 
sure that the answers received from the EFTA Court are, formally, only advisory in character. 
Presumably, the Supreme Court would prefer lower Norwegian courts to follow its precedents 
in the field of EEA law in much the same manner as in other fields of the law.8  
Still, the overarching objective of homogeneity, together with the principle of loyal 
cooperation under Article 3 EEA, strongly suggests that the lower courts should interpret and 
apply EEA law in accordance with the legal sources and the methods recognised by the ECJ 
and the EFTA Court only, thereby effectively eliminating national sources of law such as, in 
the Norwegian legal tradition, precedents from national courts. Even though it is arguable that 
decisions from the highest courts of the Member States sometimes do influence the develop-
ment of ECJ case law, the examples are few and far between. Suffice to note that whereas the 
EFTA Court and the ECJ frequently cite and, apparently, rely on each other’s decisions,9 one 
will look in vain for any reference to decisions of the Courts of last instance of the EFTA 
States.10  
Thus, from a normative perspective, it appears appropriate to submit that there are two 
EEA Courts only – the EFTA Court and the ECJ. Off course, one should then immediately 
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 See the survey cited supra note 1, pp. 83-85.  
6
 Cf. the heading of chapter 3, section 1 of the Agreement, to which Article 106 belong. Note that the former 
Court of First Instance of the European Communities (now the General Court of the EU) too is included in Arti-
cle 106, thereby, arguably, adding an eight EEA Court to the seven courts listed supra, note 4. 
7
 Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice 
(Surveillance and Court Agreement). 
8
 See Hans Petter Graver, ‘Dømmer Høyesterett i siste instans?’ (2002) 37 Jussens Venner 263-281, 267. 
9
 See the contribution of AG Sharpston in this book. 
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 For this reason, the talk of a ‘judicial dialogue’ between the national courts on the one hand and the EFTA 
Court/the ECJ on the other seem somewhat misguided, at least if the term is used in a manner indicating that this 
‘dialogue’ is comparable to the one which indeed goes on between the EFTA Court and the ECJ, see further 
Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, Europäische Vorlageverfahren und nationales Zivilprozessrecht, Tübingen 
2009, at pp. 255 f.  
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add that from a functional perspective, all national courts, not only of the EFTA States but 
also of the EU Member States, are to be regarded as functional EEA Courts whenever han-
dling EEA-related cases. The Supreme Court of Norway recognised this in the seminal 
Finanger (No. 1)-case of 2000 (full court), holding that the national courts as such are sub-
jects to the duty of loyal cooperation under Article 3 EEA and thereby obliged to interpret 
national law as far as at all possible in conformity with EEA law.11 This, however, does not 
undermine my view that the authority on the interpretation of EEA law rests with the EFTA 
Court and the ECJ.12 
In the following, an attempt will be made to analyse the relationship between the two 
EEA Courts from a Norwegian perspective, first and foremost as it emerges through the juris-
prudence of Norwegian courts.  
 
B. Norwegian courts and the two EEA Courts 
 
I. The reception of ECJ case law in Norwegian courts 
Negotiating the EEA Agreement, it was a conditio sine qua non for the EFTA States that they 
would not have to relinquish judicial sovereignty to the ‘foreign judges’ of the ECJ. Indeed, 
following the defeat of the originally foreseen common EEA Court through the ECJ’s 
(in)famous Opinion 1/91, this is the very reason for the EFTA Court’s existence. As stated 
openly by the Commission, from the perspective of homogeneity the ideal solution would 
have been for the EFTA States to accept the jurisdiction of the ECJ.13 At least from a Norwe-
gian perspective, this was both politically and, arguably, constitutionally impossible. As is 
well known, a solution was then found through the establishment of an independent Court of 
Justice for the EFTA-pillar. Important from this perspective was also the temporal limitation 
on the obligation under Article 6 EEA to follow relevant ECJ case law to judgments rendered 
prior to the date of signature of the Agreement (2 May 1992). Further, as a result of the ECJ 
insisting on the formally binding character of its preliminary rulings also in the EEA setting,14 
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 Rt. 2000 p. 1811, at 1827. It was only two years later that the EFTA Court had the opportunity to follow suit in 
Case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002] EFTA Court Report, 240, paragraph 28 and only in the later Case E-1/07 Criminal 
proceedings against A [2007] EFTA Court Report 248, that this duty of consistent interpretation of national law 
was explicitly linked to Article 3 EEA (paragraph 39).   
12
 As will be evident from the following discussion, my view is that the overarching goal of homogeneity inevi-
tably implies that the de facto supreme authority on the interpretation of substantive EEA law rests with the ECJ, 
cf. Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, ‘One Market, Two Courts: Legal Pluralism vs. Homogeneity in the European 
Economic Area’ (2010) 79 Nordic Journal of International Law 481-499. However, the fact that the ECJ takes 
the opinion of the EFTA Court into account when interpreting EEA rules alone justifies the view expressed here 
that a share of the authority on the interpretation of EEA law rests with the EFTA Court. 
13
 Cf. the submissions of the Commission in Opinion 1/92, [1992] ECR I-2821, at p. 2833. 
14
 Cf. Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 61. 
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the EFTA States, determined not to allow their national courts to ask the ECJ to decide on the 
interpretation of EEA law in accordance with Article 107 EEA, entrusted the EFTA Court 
with jurisdiction to give advisory opinions upon requests from their national courts (Article 34 
SCA). 
From this background, one would probably expect a somewhat reluctant reception of 
ECJ case law in Norwegian courts, perhaps with the courts sticking to ‘their’ EFTA Court or 
even pursuing a more independent interpretation of EEA law on their own. However, this is 
not how things have turned out. Rather on the contrary, ECJ precedents are cited and followed 
by Norwegian courts, including the Supreme Court, in much the same manner as in the EU 
Member States. 
As to the temporal limit of Article 6 EEA, a first test was the VinCompagniet case 
from 1996. However, the Supreme Court’s Appeal Selection Committee in its interpretation 
of Article 11 EEA relied on the ECJ’s 1993 judgment in Keck without any discussion of the 
relevance of this judgment in light of Article 6 EEA.15 The Supreme Court followed suit the 
following year in two important judgments concerning the interpretation of Directive 
77/187/EEC on employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings. In Eidesund, the 
Court held that ECJ judgments rendered after the date of signature of the Agreement still 
would have ‘direct consequences’ for the interpretation of the Norwegian legislation imple-
menting the directive,16 whereas the Court in Løten in so many words stated that the temporal 
limit in Article 6 EEA was of little interest for the case in question.17 A later statement to the 
same effect is found in the 2002 judgment in the so-called God Morgon-case, where the Su-
preme Court referred to Eidesund as authority for the opinion that it was clear that more re-
cent case law of the ECJ had to be taken into account.18 After God Morgon, the Supreme 
Court has simply stopped referring to Article 6 EEA, clearly indicating that the temporal limit 
of that provision has lost any meaning it might have had.19 
Further, and even more importantly, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court shows 
that ECJ case law is not only taken into account when interpreting EEA law – it is de facto 
followed as binding authority. Evidence suggests that the Supreme Court will disregard even 
clear assumptions in the travaux préparatoires and overrule its own precedents if deemed 
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 Rt. 1996 p. 1569. 
16
 Rt. 1997 p. 1954, at 1960. 
17
 Rt. 1997 p. 1965, at 1970. 
18
 Rt. 2002 p. 391, at 395-396. 
19
 Cf. Hans Petter Graver, ’The Effects of EFTA Court Jurisprudence on the Legal Orders of the EFTA States’, 
in: Baudenbacher/Tresselt/Örlygsson, The EFTA Court Ten Years On, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2005, pp. 
79-99, at 91.  
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necessary in order to interpret Norwegian law in conformity with underlying EEA obliga-
tions:  
In the 2004 judgment in Norsk Dental Depot the Supreme Court simply referred to 
ECJ’s interpretation of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) in its 2002 judgment in 
Sánchez20 to the effect that established Norwegian jurisprudence on strict liability for danger-
ous products may no longer be relied on in addition to the liability regime established by Arti-
cle 6 of the said directive.21 The fact that the legislator in the travaux préparatoires to the act 
implementing the Directive into the 1988 Act on Product Liability clearly assumed that there 
would still be room for the established Norwegian regime of strict liability was not even men-
tioned.  
Similarly, in the 2006 so-called Livbøye (lifebuoy)-case, concerning bad faith of the 
applicant as a condition for refusal to register a trademark, the Supreme Court openly over-
ruled an earlier decision on the interpretation of Article 4 (4) litra g of the Trademark Di-
rective (89/104/EEC).22 Nothing in the judgment indicates that the Supreme Court accorded 
its own previous judgment any authority in this respect – the court simply stated that subse-
quent clarification through decisions of The Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market 
(OHIM) called for an interpretation deviating from the one previously held. 
Importantly, both Norsk Dental Depot and the Livbøye-case concerned the application 
of EEA law in the horizontal relationship between private parties. Still, in neither were the 
principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty nor the dualistic approach to EEA 
obligations stemming from Norwegian constitutional law even contemplated as a possible 
hindrance to consistent interpretation of the national legislation in question. Even though not 
explicitly limiting the scope of the statements of the full court in Finanger (No I) on recog-
nised (Norwegian) methods of interpretation as a limit to the possibility to give effect to EEA 
law in Norwegian courts, the judgments in Norsk Dental Depot and in the Livbøye-case clear-
ly show that the Supreme Court’s adherence to the dualistic traditions of Norway is of greater 
significance in principle than in practice. Indeed, in the 17 years of existence of the EEA 
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 Case C-183/00 Sánchez [2002] ECR I-3901. 
21
 Rt. 2004 p. 122, paragraph 31. 
22
 Rt. 2006 p. 1473, overruling Rt. 1998 p. 1809 (BUD). It the earlier decision, the Supreme Court had held that 
mere knowledge of existing use of a similar mark by another meant that the trade mark could not be registered, 
whereas the Court in Norsk Dental Depot clarified that registration may only be refused if the applicant was 
acting in bad faith at the date of the application. The earlier decision may seem strange in the face of the clear 
wording of Article 4 (4) litra g of the Trademark Directive, but it was probably caused by the rather unfortunate 
wording of the corresponding Section 14 (7) of the 1961 Norwegian Trade Mark Act (now replaced by the 2010 
Trade Mark Act). Actually, nothing in the 1998-judgment suggests that the Supreme Court was aware of the 
EEA-dimension of the case! 
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Agreement Finanger (No 1) remains the only case where it proved impossible to interpret 
Norwegian law in conformity with underlying EEA obligations. And further, in 17 years there 
is not a single case where the lack of EU style direct effect in the EEA setting has hindered 
the reception of ECJ case law in Norwegian courts.  
The loyal reception of ECJ case law is perhaps particularly striking in cases where no 
clear precedent may be found. Avoiding any temptation it may have had to pursue its own 
interpretation of EEA law, the Supreme Court’s approach in such cases is to analyse existing 
ECJ case law and try to deduce whatever guidelines it can from the reasoning of the ECJ in 
cases involving more or less similar questions.23 In the two recent judgments Nye Kystlink and 
Bottolvs concerning alleged age discrimination, the Supreme Court stated that Norwegian 
courts should interpret the ban against age discrimination in Directive 2000/78/EC as would 
the ECJ if the case had been referred to it.24 As directive 2000/78/EC is not part of the EEA 
Agreement, a reference to the EFTA Court was no alternative.25 Even though the court was 
careful to tie its adherence to ECJ case law to the presumed intentions of the legislator when 
voluntarily implementing the Directive into Norwegian law, both judgments show that the 
reception of ECJ case law is extended even beyond the scope of EEA law.26  
Striking is certainly too the decision of presiding justice Tjomsland in the age discrim-
ination case CHC Norway, staying the proceedings before the Supreme Court in order to 
await the preliminary judgment of the ECJ in Prigge.27 A better illustration of the Supreme 
Court’s adherence to the ECJ than staying a pending case, quite possibly for as long as a full 
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 See, in particular, the following statements in God Morgon, cited supra note 17, at p. 396: ‘[There] exists in 
the EC an extensive case law on the conditions for registration of trademarks, but there is no decision from the 
ECJ which directly relates to the interpretative question that is to be decided in our case. It is therefore a question 
of what one can infer from the conclusions and the premises in cases involving more or less similar questions’ 
(my translation). Tellingly, the lack of clarifying ECJ case law did not prompt the Supreme Court to request the 
EFTA Court to give an advisory opinion, see further infra, section III. 
24
 Rt. 2010 p. 202, paragraph 56 and Rt. 2011 p. 609, paragraph 72.  
25
 Still, in light of the ECJ’s (controversial) finding in Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981 of the ban 
against age discrimination as a general principle of EU law, apparently independent from the Directive, one 
could have referred to the EFTA Court the highly interesting question whether this general principle nonetheless 
must be seen as an inherent part of EEA law. However, the judgments clearly show that the Supreme Court was 
not aware of this (possible) EEA dimension of the cases. 
26
 In Nye Kystlink, cited supra note 24, justices Flock and Stabel dissented on this point, holding that they could 
not see that the legislator intended the implementation of the directive to impact on the interpretation of an estab-
lished statutory provision establishing a pensionable age of 62 years for seamen. However, in Bottolvs, cited 
supra note 24, the Supreme Court unanimously cited Nye Kystlink as authority for the view that Norwegian 
courts should interpret the Directive in conformity with subsequent ECJ case law. 
27
 Rt. 2010 p. 944, staying the proceedings in order to await the outcome of the pending case C-447/09 Prigge. 
Just as the cases Nye Kystlink and Bottolvs, CHC Norway concerns the interpretation of the ban against age dis-
crimination in Directive 2000/78/EC and appears as such not to be a candidate for a reference to the EFTA Court 
(but see the reservation made supra, note 25). 
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year and against the will of one of the parties to the case, in order to make sure that Norwe-
gian law is interpreted and applied in conformity with ECJ case law, is hard to imagine.  
In conclusion, the reception of ECJ case law in Norwegian courts is of such a charac-
ter and scope that it is barely possible to identify any substantive differences between the ef-
fect of ECJ case law in Norway and in the EU Member States.28 This is not to say that the 
Supreme Court, and certainly not lower Norwegian courts, always gets it right. As will appear 
from the following, questions may be raised as to the interpretation and application of EEA 
law in quite a number of cases. This is, however, hardly different from the situation in the EU 
Member States. The main finding for our present purposes is that Norwegian courts certainly 
do seem to try to get it right – there is little evidence to support any suggestion of reluctance 
towards the reception of ECJ case law. 
 
II. The reception of EFTA Court case law in Norwegian courts 
As to the reception of EFTA Court case law in Norwegian Courts, Finanger (No. 1) is still the 
leading case. At the outset, the Supreme Court (full court) stressed that the opinions of the 
EFTA Court under Article 34 SCA are of an advisory character only and that it is for the Su-
preme Court to decide for itself whether and to what extent they are to be followed. Still, re-
ferring to the fact that the EFTA States had found it appropriate to establish a separate court 
of justice for the EFTA-pillar, to the EFTA Court’s expert knowledge of EEA law, to the 
rules of procedure opening up for input from the Commission, the EFTA Surveillance Au-
thority and the EEA Member States and to the clear intentions of the Norwegian parliament 
when approving the EEA Agreement, the Supreme Court held that the case law of the EFTA 
Court is to be accorded ‘significant weight’ by Norwegian courts when interpreting the EEA 
Agreement.29 Subsequent approval of these statements is found in important judgments such 
as Paranova, Finanger (No. 2), Gaming Machines and Pedicel.30 
Further, in the Gaming Machines case, the Appeals Selection Committee decided to 
stay the proceedings before the Supreme Court in order to await the judgment of the EFTA 
Court in an infringement action brought by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on essentially 
the same legal matter (the compatibility of the Norwegian monopoly on the operation on gam-
ing machines with Articles 31 and 36 EEA). The infringement case was clearly brought as a 
                                                 
28
 So the main conclusion of Finn Arnesen and Are Stenvik, ‘Internasjonalisering og juridisk metode – særlig om 
EØS-rettens betydning i norsk rett’, Oslo 2009, at p. 142.  
29
 Rt. 2000 p. 1811 (Finanger (No. I), at p. 1820. 
30
 Cf. Rt. 2004 p. 904, paragraph 67; Rt. 2005 p. 1365, paragraph 52; Rt. 2007 p. 1003, paragraph 79; Rt. 2009 p. 
839, paragraph 7. 
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response to the refusal of the Supreme Court to request an advisory opinion from the EFTA 
Court. Given that the Appeals Selection Committee was faced with the delicate situation of 
parallel proceedings in the Supreme Court and the EFTA Court on the very same legal matter, 
its decision to stay the proceedings is not fully comparable to the abovementioned decision in 
CHC Norway to await the preliminary judgment of the ECJ in Prigge. Nonetheless, the rea-
sons offered to stay the proceedings in Gaming Machines are of significant interest: In the 
opinion of majority of the Appeal Selection Committee (justices Tjomsland and Aasland), the 
EFTA Court was the judicial body which would decide ‘with finality’ on whether the contest-
ed Norwegian legislation was in breach of Norway’s obligations under the EEA Agreement.31 
Thus, it fell to the EFTA Court to give ‘the authoritative answer’ to the question of EEA law 
present in the case before the Supreme Court.  
The general acknowledgment of the authority of the EFTA Court is followed up by the 
Supreme Court in its interpretation and application of EEA law in concrete cases. Importantly, 
there are no examples of Norwegian courts, be it the Supreme Court or lower courts, deviating 
from advisory opinions obtained from the EFTA Court.32  
Out of a total of 33 separate cases in which Norwegian courts have obtained advisory 
opinions from the EFTA Court,33 as many as 16 were settled in the wake of the EFTA Court’s 
answer. In most of these cases it seems that the EFTA Court’s reply was of such a character 
that the claim in the main case before the Norwegian court was either accepted by the defend-
ant or given up by the plaintiff. This applies to at least two out of the remaining 17 cases too – 
both in Astra and in Fokus Bank the proceedings before Norwegian courts continued only for 
reasons which had little do to with the EFTA Court’s interpretation of EEA law.34    
Out of the remaining 15 cases, there are several in which the party dissatisfied with the 
answer from the EFTA Court tried to persuade Norwegian courts not to follow it.35 However, 
in no case have the objections to the EFTA Court’s opinion been able to convince the receiv-
                                                 
31
 Rt. 2005 p. 1598, paragraph 7 (my translation). As to the dissenting opinion of justice Skoghøy, se further 
infra section IV. 
32
 See, in detail, the survey cited supra note 2, at pp. 88 ff. 
33
 See the cases listed in the survey cited supra note 2, at p. 89, with the addition that the dispute giving rise to 
Case E-1/10 Periscopus too has now been settled out of court. Note further that the main proceedings in the 
cases E-16/10 Philip Morris, E-1/11 Dr. A and E-2/11 STX Norway are still pending before Norwegian courts (as 
of January 2012). 
34
 In Astra, the plaintiff explicitly accepted the EFTA Court’s interpretation of EEA law in Case E-1/98 Astra 
[1998] EFTA Court Report 140, but tried in vain to continue the proceedings before Borgarting Court of Appeal 
on other grounds. In Fokus Bank, the Norwegian government similarly accepted the EFTA Court’s interpretation 
of Article 40 EEA in Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank [2004] EFTA Court Report 11, but held that it was still not appli-
cable in Norwegian courts for reasons of Norwegian constitutional law! Frostating Court of Appeal was not 
convinced and the Government’s appeal to the Supreme Court was later withdrawn. 
35
 See, e.g., Rt. 1997 p. 1965 (Eidesund); RG 2000 p. 833 (Ulstein); RG 2000 p. 385 (Nille); Rt. 2000 p. 1811 
(Finanger No. 1) and Rt. 2004 p. 904 (Paranova). 
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ing court. In some cases failed attempts to get the receiving court to deviate from the position 
of the EFTA Court have lead to an appeal, but with equally little success.36  
The closest one gets to a case where some questions may be raised as to the loyal ap-
plication of guidelines offered by the EFTA Court in an advisory opinion, is the judgment of 
Oslo District Court in Ladbrokes.37 Arguably, the District Court’s assessment of the propor-
tionality of the Norwegian restrictions on gambling in this case appears somewhat more re-
laxed than suggested by the EFTA Court. The application of the proportionality principle is, 
however, so inextricably connected to the fact of the concrete case that it is difficult for out-
side observers to assess the District Court’s judgment. And, further, the guidelines offered by 
the EFTA Court in Ladbrokes apparently suggested an even more thorough assessment of the 
proportionality of the national restrictions than did the ECJ in the subsequent case Liga Por-
tugesa.38 
Further, and of significant importance, Norwegian courts do not differentiate between 
advisory opinions obtained by themselves in the case at hand and other parts of EFTA Court 
case law, be it opinions given in other cases or judgments rendered in cases brought directly 
before the EFTA Court. The Supreme Court appears to be of the opinion that EFTA Court 
case law in general is to be accorded ‘significant weight’ by Norwegian courts.39 In the semi-
nal Finanger (No. 2) case, the Supreme Court (full court) in so many words accepted the EF-
TA Court’s controversial finding of the principle of state liability as an inherent part of the 
EEA Agreement. Writing for a court which at this point was unanimous, justice Gussgard 
cited extensively from the EFTA Court’s reasoning in Sveinbjörnsdóttir, repeated that the 
opinion of the EFTA Court was to be given ‘significant weight’ and simply added that she 
found the reasoning of the EFTA Court ‘convincing’.40 
As a result of this approach, even in cases where no reference is made to the EFTA 
Court, the abovementioned survey of the application of EEA law in Norwegian courts has 
revealed only one case in 17 years where a Norwegian court explicitly deviated from EFTA 
Court case law – the 2004 judgment from Oslo District Court in KLM.41 Tellingly, this judg-
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 See, e.g., Rt. 1997 p. 1965 (Eidesund); RG 2000 p. 833 (Ulstein); RG 2000 p. 385 (Nille). 
37
 Judgment 3 October 2008 in Case No 04-091873TVI-OTIR/04.  
38
 Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa [2009] ECR I-7633. Tellingly, Ladbrokes decided to withdraw its appeal to 
Borgarting Court of Appeal after the ECJ’s judgment in Liga Portuguesa.  
39
 See, in particular, Rt. 2007 p. 1003 (Gaming Machines), in which the previous assessment of the authority of 
advisory opinions of the EFTA Court was extended to the EFTA Court’s judgment in an infringement case. 
40
 Rt. 2005 p. 1365, paragraphs 46 ff. 
41
 Judgment 2 July 2004 in Case No. 04-000806TVI-OTIR/07, in which Oslo District Court held the interpreta-
tion of Article 36 EEA in Case E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland [2003] EFTA Court Report 143 to 
be incompatible with the interpretation of what is now Articles 56 and 58 TFEU in Case C-92/01 Stylianakis 
[2003] ECR I-1291.  
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ment was appealed to Borgarting Court of Appeal, which decided to make a reference to the 
EFTA Court. This again prompted the Norwegian government to accept that the EEA law 
provision in question, Council Regulation 2408/92 on Access for Community carriers to intra-
Community air routes, was indeed operative in Norwegian law, rendering the question on the 
relationship between the regulation and the main provision on free movement of services in 
Article 36 EEA void. Thus, no assessment equalling that of Oslo District Court is to be found 
in the subsequent judgments of the appellate courts.42 
 
III.  But: Persistent lack of referrals to the EFTA Court 
Still, all is not well in the relationship between the EFTA Court and the Norwegian Supreme 
Court. In the 18 years of existence of the EEA Agreement, the Supreme Court has only 
decided to refer questions on the interpretation of EEA law to the EFTA Court on four 
occasions – European Navigation, Finanger (No. 1), Paranova and the Jet-ski case. Out of 
these four, the Appeals Selection Committee withdrew its referral in European Navigation (as 
a consequence of the appellant withdrawing his appeal),43 whereas the decision to refer in the 
Jet-ski case was reversed even before the request was sent to the EFTA Court (as it turned out 
that the jet-skies in question originated from outside the EEA).44 Thus, in 18 years the EFTA 
Court has only twice been given the opportunity to answer questions on the interpretation of 
EEA law from the Supreme Court of Norway. It is cold comfort that the Supreme Court in 
both these cases, Finanger (No. 1) and Paranova, followed the opinions of the EFTA Court.45 
Obviously, with only four requests in 17 years, there is no shortage of cases in which 
unresolved questions of EEA law has been raised before the Supreme Court without any such 
request beeing made. At first sight, some of these cases may be explained by the Supreme 
Court apparently applying its own, particularly lenient understanding of the notion of acte 
clair. The descision not to request an advisory opinion in the Gaming Machines case is 
illustrative: According to the Appeals Selection Committee, there was no reason to request an 
advisory opinion from the EFTA Court as the impact of EU/EEA law in the field of gaming 
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 See, ultimately, Rt. 2008 p. 738. In the wake of the government’s admission before the Court of Appeal, the 
request for an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court was withdrawn. Thereafter, the case came to be one about 
repayment of unlawfully levied duties. Arguably, a second request to the EFTA Court concerning possible limi-
tations of EEA law to the governments ‘passing-on’ defence would have been appropriate. 
43
 Cf. the order of the president of the EFTA Court in Case E-5/97 European Navigation [1998] EFTA Court 
Report 59.   
44
 Cf. the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Rt. 2004 p. 834. It is noteworthy that one of the 
justices participating in the case, justice Lund, held that there was no reason to make a request to the EFTA 
Court even assuming that the case fell within the scope of the EEA Agreement, cf. his dissent in the decision to 
refer of 5 December 2003 (Case No. 2003/1094 and 2003/1095). 
45
 Cf. Rt. 2000 p. 1811 and Rt. 2004 p. 904. 
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had to be considered ‘largely resolved’ through existing ECJ case law.46 This assessment is 
impossible to reconcile with the ECJ’s strict understanding of acte clair as established in 
CILFIT and subsequent case law.47 Suffice to note that no less than nine EEA Member States 
found it apropriate to take part in the subsequent infringement case before the EFTA Court48 
and that the ECJ has referred later cases raising similar questions to its Grand Chamber.49 
Further, one is bound to ask why a case allegdly concerning already resolved legal questions 
was referred to the Supreme Court at all, not to mention the decision ot the Chief Justice to 
refer the case to the full court.50 On top of everything, the Supreme Court itself later described 
the case as one involving ‘difficult legal questions of major significance’ in its descision to 
exempt the plaintiffs from liability for the government’s costs.51 Still, the reasons offered by 
the Appeals Selection Committee in Gaming Machines could be understood as implying that 
it would request an opinion from the EFTA Court in a case in which a question of EEA law 
even by its own very lenient standards could not be considered as acte clair. 
However, other cases clearly show that the Supreme Court under no circumstance feel 
obliged to refer questions of EEA law to the EFTA Court. Particularly illustrating is the 
Finanger (No. 2) case from 2005, in which the Supreme Court (full court) split 9-4 not only 
over the concrete asessment of the case, but also over the fundamental question of the role of 
discretion in EEA law on State liability for defective implementation of directives.52 The 
plaintiff had urged for a request to be made to the EFTA Court, but the Supreme Court could 
not be convinced. Still, and of significant importance, the subsequent outcome of the case 
shows that there is no basis for any suggestion that the Supreme Court kept the case to itself 
in order to avvoid an unwelcome answer from Luxembourg: The majority quashed the 
judgment of the Borgarting Court of Appeal, upholding the judgment of the Oslo District 
Court awarding Ms. Finanger damages. The case could be argued both ways and it is thus 
interesting that a rather clear majority of the Supreme Court ruled against the State – evidence 
from state liability cases from other EEA Member States seem to suggest that this is not 
always the case.53  
                                                 
46
 Decision of the Appeals Selection Committee 17 October 2005. 
47
 Case 281/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415, paragraphs 14 ff. 
48
 See Case E-1/06 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2007] EFTA Court Report 8. 
49
 See, e.g., Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa [2009] ECR I-7633. 
50
 This decision was later reversed in the wake of the EFTA Court’s judgment in Case E-1/06 EFTA Surveillance 
Authority v Norway [2007] EFTA Court Report 8. 
51
 See Rt. 2007 p. 1003, paragraph 110. 
52
 Rt. 2005 p. 1365. 
53
 See Carl Baudenbacher, ‘The implementation of decisions of the ECJ and of the EFTA Court in the Member 
States’ domestic legal systems’ 40 Texas International Law Journal (2005) 383-416, at 407 ff. 
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Earlier examples of the Supreme Court deciding on its own questions of EEA law  
which it itself, explicitly or implicitly, recognised as beeing unresolved, may be found in 
cases such as Spets and Hunter (both concerning Directive 86/653/EEC on commercial 
agents) as well as God Morgon and Gule Sider (both concerning the Trade Mark Directive).54 
More recent examples are found in two important judgments concerning EEA rules on 
consumer protection – Jato v Solbakken from 2006 (known in Norway as the “boot heel-
case”) and Sandven v Westrum from 2010.55 The former case concerned interpretation of 
Article 3 (3) of Directive 1999/44/EC on the sale of consumer goods, whereas the latter raised 
questions as to the understaning of the concept “distance contract” as defined in Article 2 (1) 
of Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts. In both 
cases the Supreme Court appears to have got it right, but in neither could the relevant 
questions of EEA reasonably be held to be acte clair. The same goes for Otterstad, a 2008 
judgment concerning the possibility of reducing compensation to a passenger riding in a car 
driven by an intoxicated driver as a consequence of contributory negligence.56 The EFTA 
Court dealt with this question in Finanger, holding that it would be incompatible with the 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives if compensation was to be reduced in a way which was 
disproportionate to the contribution to the injury by the injured party.57 Thus, in essence, 
Otterstad concerned the concrete implications of this assessment. The plaintiff urged the 
Supreme Court to ask the EFTA Court for more detailed guidelines, but in vain. However, 
just as in Finanger (No. 2), there followed a rather ‘EEA-friendly’ judgment, where the rather 
harsh reduction imposed by Agder Court of Appeal (60 %) was reduced to 40 % (close to the 
30 % suggested by the plaintiff himself). 
Two even more recent examples are found in the judgments Edquist from 2010 and 
Tine from 2011.58 Edquist is to a certain extent the Norwegian parallell to the English Test 
Claimants cases59, raising questions of repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU/EEA law 
and, alternatively, State liability (as well as questions on statutory limitation and procedural 
                                                 
54
 Rt. 1999 p. 569; Rt. 2001 p. 1390; Rt. 2002 p. 391; Rt. 2005 p. 1601. On these and other cases such as Rt. 
1997 p. 1954 (Løten), Rt. 1999 p. 393; Rt. 1999 p. 977 (Nemko) and Rt. 2001 p. 248 (Olderdalen ambulanse), 
see Henrik Bull, ‘European Law and Norwegian Courts’, in: Müller-Graff/Selvig (eds), The Approach to Euro-
pean Law in Germany and Norway, Berlin 2004, pp. 95-114, at 112 ff. 
55
 Rt. 2006 p. 179 and Rt. 2010 p. 1580. 
56
 Rt. 2008 p. 453. 
57
 Case E-1/99 Finanger [1999] EFTA Court Report 119, paragraph 34. The ECJ followed suit in Case C-537/03 
Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745 and Case C-356/05 Farrell [2007] ECR I-3067. 
58
 Rt. 2010 p. 1500 and judgment 22 June 2011 in Case 2010/1947 (nyr). 
59
 Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11673; Case C-446/04 
Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11753; Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap 
Group Litigation [2007] ECR I-2107; Case C-201/05 Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation 
[2008] ECR I-2875. 
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time limits). Just as the English Test Claimants cases, Edquist was choosen as a test case, with 
proceedings in more than 100 similar cases stayed in order to await the outcome. In light of 
the ECJ’s assessment in the Test Claimants cases, it was fairly evident that the treshold of a 
sufficient serious breach was not met in Edquist either.60 Still, the case raised difficult 
questions concerning the possible impact of the principle of equivalence as the private parties 
argued that established Norwegian law on State liability offered better protection in 
comparable situations. Their plea for a request to the EFTA Court was, however, not heard by 
the Supreme Court.  
By contrast, in Tine, the first competition law case concerning allegded abuse of a 
dominant position ever to be heard by the Supreme Court, the parties reportedly agreed not to 
ask for a request to be made to the EFTA Court. As the allegded abuse was deemed not to 
have any effect on inter-state trade, the case fell outside the scope of Article 54 EEA. Still, as 
Section 11 of the Norwegian Competition Act mirrors Article 54 EEA and the case raised 
several unresolved legal questions, it may be argued that a request to the EFTA Court would 
have been appropriate.61 
The list of cases in which unresolved questions of EEA law has been raised before the 
Supreme Court without any request beeing made to the EFTA Court could easily be 
prolonged. However, the examples mentioned already seem more than sufficient to support 
the conclusion that there is a persistent reluctance in the Supreme Court as to the use of Arti-
cle 34 SCA.62 
 
IV. Including lower Norwegian courts in the picture 
If broadened to encompass all Norwegian courts, a somewhat less disturbing picture emerges: 
 
Fig. 1: Norwegian referrals to the EFTA Court 1994-2011 
  EFTA Court Case No. Referring court/tribunal 
1994 2 E-8/94 Forbrukerombudet v Mattel Scandinavia AS 
E-9/94 Forbrukerombudet v Lego Norge AS 
Market Council 
Market Council 
1995 2 E-2/95 Eidesund v Stavanger Catering AS 
E-3/95 Langeland v Norske Fabricom AS 
Gulating Court of Appeal 
Stavanger City Court 
1996 5 E-2/96 Ulstein og Røiseng v Asbjørn Møller 
E-3/96 Ask v ABB Offshore Technology AS 
E-4/96 Gundersen v Oslo municipality  
Inderøy District Court 
Gulating Court of Appeal 
Oslo City Court 
                                                 
60
 See, e.g., Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, cited supra note 58, paragraph 215 and Test Claimants in 
the Thin Cap Group Litigation, cited supra note 58, paragraph 121. 
61
 The fact that the case fell outside the scope of Article 54 EEA would not have prevented the EFTA Court from 
answering questions on the interpretation of that provision, cf. the ECJ’s approach in such cases as laid down in 
Case C-297/88 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I-3763, paragraphs 29 ff. 
62
 Cf. Graver, cited supra note 19, at p. 89 (’a certain reluctance’). 
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E-5/96 Ullensaker municipality v Nille AS 
E-6/96 Tore Wilhelmsen AS v Oslo municipality 
Borgarting Court of Appeal 
Oslo City Court 
1997 5 E-1/97 Gundersen v Oslo municipality 
E-2/97 Mag Instrument Inc v California Trading Comp Norway 
E-3/97 Jæger v Opel Norge AS 
E-5/97 European Navigation Inc v Star Forsikring AS 
E-8/97 TV 1000 Sverige AB v Norway 
Oslo City Court 
Fredrikstad City Court 
Nedre Romerike Distr Court 
Supreme Court 
Oslo City Court 
1998 2 E-1/98 Norway v Astra Norge AS 
E-4/98 Blyth Software Ltd. v AlphaBit AS  
Borgarting Court of Appeal 
Oslo City Court 
1999 1 E-1/99 Storebrand Skadeforsikring AS v Finanger Supreme Court 
2000 2 E-2/00 Allied Colloids v Norway 
E-8/00 LO v KS 
Oslo City Court 
Labour Court 
2001 3 E-6/01 CIBA v Norway 
E-7/01 Hegelstad v Hydro Texaco AS 
E-8/01 Gunnar Amundsen AS v Vectura AS 
Oslo City Court 
Gulating Court of Appeal 
Borgarting Court of Appeal 
2002 1 E-3/02 Paranova AS v Merck & Co Inc. Supreme Court 
2003 -   
2004 4 E-1/04 Fokus Bank ASA v Norway 
E-2/04 Rasmussen v Total E&P Norge AS 
E-3/04 Athanasios v Norway 
E-4/04 Pedicel AS v Norway 
Frostating Court of Appeal 
Gulating Court of Appeal 
Gulating Court of Appeal 
Market Council 
2005 -   
2006 2 E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. V Norway 
E-4/06 KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v Norway 
Oslo District Court 
Borgarting Court of Appeal 
2007 5 E-7/07 Seabrokers AS v Norway 
E-8/07 Nguyen v Norway 
E-9/07 L’Oréal Norge AS v Per Aarskog AS 
E-10/07 L’Oréal Norge AS v Nille AS and Smart Club AS 
E-11/07 Rindal v Norway 
Stavanger District Court 
Oslo District Court 
Follo District Court 
Oslo District Court 
Borgarting Court of Appeal 
2008 1 E-1/09 Slinning v Norway  Oslo District Court 
2009 -   
2010 2 E-1/10 Periscopus v Oslo Børs and Erik Must AS 
E-16/10 Philip Morris Norway AS v Norway 
Oslo District Court 
Oslo District Court 
2011 2 E-1/11 Dr. A v Norway 
 
E-2/11 STX Norway Offshore AS v Norway 
E-15/11 Arcade Drilling v Norway 
Norwegian Appeal Board 
for Health Personnel 
Borgarting Court of Appeal 
Oslo District Court 
 
If including the three requests made in 2011, the total number of Norwegian referrals to the 
EFTA Court 1994-2011 is 40. Out of these, 36 (90%) stem from lower courts or tribunals. 
Still, the more cooperative attitude of the lower courts has only heightened the number 
of requests for advisory opinions from Norwegian courts to an average just over two pro an-
no. If compared with the number of preliminary references to the two EEA courts from the 
other Nordic EEA countries in the last ten years (2001-2010), the statistics are as follows:  
 
Fig. 2: Preliminary references from the Nordic countries 2001-2010 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Norway 3 1 - 4 - 2 5 1 - 2 18 
Iceland 3 - 1 - 1 - 2 - - 1 8 
Denmark 5 8 3 4 4 3 5 6 3 10 51 
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Finland 3 7 4 4 4 5 5 4 2 6 44 
Sweden 4 5 4 5 11 2 6 7 5 6 55 
 
The numbers show that Danish, Finnish and Swedish judges, on average, annually contribute 
each with more than twice as many preliminary references to the ECJ as their Norwegian 
counterparts submit to the EFTA Court. If one takes into account that the Icelandic population 
only amounts to about 300 000, Icelandic judges too appear more willing to request advisory 
opinions from the EFTA Court. Now, importantly, as the scope of EU law is broader that that 
of EEA law, the numbers are not completely comparable as between the EU Member States 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden on the one hand and the EFTA States Iceland and Norway of 
the other. Still, even taking this into account, the differences are so substantial that it seems 
safe to submit that Danish, Finnish and Swedish judges appear more cooperative towards the 
ECJ than is their Norwegian counterparts towards the EFTA Court.63 
Just as with the Supreme Court, there is no shortage of cases from the lower courts in 
which unresolved questions of EEA law has been decided without any request for an advisory 
opinion beeing made to the EFTA Court. This is not the proper occasion to go into the details, 
but the decisions not to refer in the three cases European Naviagtion, KLM and Gaming 
Machines merit particular attention: As mentioned above, the 2004 judgment from Oslo Dis-
trict Court judgment in KLM is the only case in which a Norwegian court has explicitly devi-
ated from EFTA Court case law. According to the District Court, the interpretation of Article 
36 EEA in Case E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland was incompatible with the 
ECJ’s interpretation of what is now Articles 56 and 58 TFEU in Stylianakis.64 The District 
Court chose to follow the ECJ, apparently even without considering the possibility to ask the 
EFTA Court for clarification! In European Naviagtion and Gaming Machines, on the other 
hand, the question of a possible preliminary reference to the EFTA Court was considered by 
Borgarting Court of Appeal, but ultimately rejected.65 The decision in European Navigation is 
striking because the Court of Appeal subsequently held that the possible impact of EEA law 
upon the rules on security for costs in the Norwegian Act on civil procedure was too uncertain 
to justify disapplication of the latter!66 The decision in Gaming Machines is equally striking 
                                                 
63
 Unfortunately, ECJ statistics do not provide the information necessary in order to exclude preliminary refer-
ences from national courts and tribunals in cases which fall outside the scope of the EEA Agreement. 
64
 See supra note 41.  
65
 See the decisions of 22 April 1997 (LB-1997-1) and of 26 August 2005 (LB-2005-5287). 
66
 As mentioned supra note 43 and accompanying text, the case was ultimately brought before the Supreme 
Court. The Appeals Selection Committee decided to request an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court, but it 
was later withdrawn as the appellant withdrew his appeal. Still, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of Article 4 
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because this is a rare example of a case where both parties appearing before the court, the 
operators of gaming machines and the Norwegian government (!) alike, pleaded for a 
preliminary reference to the EFTA Court. Still, the presiding judge at the Court of Appeal 
simply stated that he did not see ‘sufficient grounds’ for such a reference. A subsequent 
application to the court to reverse that decision was not granted.  
 
V. An attempt at understanding the lack of Norwegian referrals to the EFTA Court 
Given the unequivocal wording of Article 34 SCA and the fact that the EEA Agreement itself 
does not foresee even the possibility of preliminary references to the EFTA Court, it seems 
that the Supreme Court is under no obligation to request advisory opinions from the EFTA 
Court.67 Recourse to Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights hardly alters 
this – as long as EEA-based civil rights and obligations are adequately protected by the na-
tional courts of the EFTA States, Article 6 (1) seems to be satisfied.68  
Still, the lack of an obligation to refer hardly answers the question why the Supreme 
Court does not make use of its unequivocal right to turn to the EFTA Court. As the court it-
self, unfortunately, offers little or no reasons in its decisions, one is largely left to speculate.  
As far as the inevitable delay of the national proceedings brought about by a prelimi-
nary reference is concerned, one should perhaps think that this would result in a higher num-
ber of referrals to the EFTA Court. After all, the average time it takes to receive an answer 
from the EFTA Court seems to be about 8 months, far better than the ECJ’s average of 16 
months in 2010.69 Still, Norwegian courts take great pride in their status as the most efficient 
courts in Europe.70 In civil cases, the average time of proceedings before the Supreme Court is 
as little as 6 months.71 Even though the abovementioned decisions to request advisory opin-
ions in European Navigation, Finanger and Paranova as well as the decisions to stay the pro-
ceedings in both Gaming Machines and CHC Norway do show that the Supreme Court will 
                                                                                                                                                        
EEA in this case resulted in the EFTA Surveillance Authority threatening to bring an infringement action before 
the EFTA Court. The Norwegian rules on security for costs were then changend, with an exeption for EEA 
foreigners beeing introduced. 
67
 For a different view, see Skuli Magnusson, ‘On the Authority of Advisory Opinions – Reflections on the Func-
tions and the Normativity of Advisory Opinions of the EFTA Court’ (2010) 13 Europarättslig Tidskrift pp. 528-
551, deducing an obligation to refer from the general duty of loyal cooperation in Article 3 EEA. 
68
 See Fredriksen, Europäische Vorlageverfahren und nationales Zivilprozessrecht, cited supra note 10, at p. 
185. 
69
 The latter number stems from the ECJ’s Annual Report for 2010. As the EFTA Court does not publish a simi-
lar report, the former number stems from a survey of recent preliminary references decided by the EFTA Court. 
70
 Cf. the 4th report of the European Commission for Efficiency of Justice (2010), available at www.coe.int/cepej.   
71
 Cf. the 2010 Annual Report of the Norwegian Courts Administration, available at www.domstol.no. On aver-
age, it took the Appeals Selection Committee one month to decide whether or not to grant leave to appeal and 
then, if answered in the affirmative, another 4,8 months for the Supreme Court to judge on the merits. In criminal 
cases, the average time of proceedings before the Supreme Court is as little as three months. 
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not always let the goal of efficiency prevail, it might be that the Court is more sensitive to the 
delays brought about by a preliminary reference than is the courts of other EEA States. 
Further, the work and appurtenant costs related to a preliminary reference is surely al-
so taken into consideration. Still, these factors are hardly sufficient alone to explain why 
Norwegian courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, refer far fewer cases to 
Luxembourg than do the courts in the other Nordic EEA States. It is possible, however, that 
the Norwegian legislator’s emphasis on proportionality as a general principle of civil proce-
dure in the new 2005 Dispute Act has lead Norwegian courts to think twice before requesting 
an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court: According to Section 1-1, the procedure and the 
costs involved shall be ‘reasonably proportionate to the importance of the case’. If not read in 
an EEA-friendly manner, this principle could be understood as raising the threshold for a ref-
erence in cases where the value of the subject matter of the action is rather low (as, e.g., in 
most consumer protection cases). 
Assuming that considerations of delays, work and costs alone are not sufficient to ex-
plain why Norwegian courts refer far fewer cases to Luxembourg than do the courts in the 
other Nordic EEA States, it is tempting to add the specificities of the judicial architecture of 
the EEA Agreement as an EEA specific explanation. As the EFTA Court consistently (and 
commendably) has let the objective of a homogeneous EEA prevail over any temptation it 
may have had to pursue its own interpretation of the EEA Agreement, the result is, it is sub-
mitted, the de facto acknowledgment of the ECJ as the supreme authority on the interpretation 
of (substantive) EEA law.72 In the EFTA Court’s own words in L’Oréal: the goal of homoge-
neity ‘calls for an interpretation of EEA law in line with new case law of the ECJ regardless 
of whether the EFTA Court has previously ruled on the question’.73 
Particularly illustrating from the perspective of Norwegian courts are the circumstanc-
es in Finanger. This being the very first case where the Supreme Court obtained an advisory 
opinion from the EFTA Court, it may only be describes as unfortunate that the ECJ rendered 
its not particularly clear judgment in Ferreira before the Supreme Court could hand down its 
final judgment.74 Rather than straightforward application of the EFTA Court’s opinion in the 
case, the Supreme Court found itself faced with submissions on contradicting case law from 
the two EEA Courts. The Supreme Court eventually managed to distinguish the cases, but 
only after a rather thorough analysis of Ferreira. As stated by Henrik Bull, its willingness to 
                                                 
72
 See further Fredriksen, ‘One Market, Two Courts: Legal Pluralism vs. Homogeneity in the European Econom-
ic Area’, cited supra note 12. 
73
 Joined cases E-9/07 and E-10/07 L’Oréal [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 258, paragraph 29. 
74
 Case C-348/98 Ferreira [2000] ECR I-6711. 
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go into detailed analysis of Ferreira certainly indicates that the Supreme Court would be pre-
pared ‘to opt for the ECJ version rather than the EFTA version of EEA law’ if convinced that 
there was indeed a divergence in the case law of the two EEA courts.75  
Intent to side with the ECJ in a case of diverging case law may arguably also be in-
ferred from the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Edquist. Here, the Supreme Court found 
it appropriate to note as an obiter dictum that the EFTA Court had failed to convince the ECJ 
that international tax treaties must be excluded when determining the presence or absence of 
discrimination between resident and non-resident shareholders under Article 40 EEA/Article 
63 TFEU. The Supreme Court added that it could thus be expected that the EFTA Court 
would be ’unable to maintain the views from the Fokus Bank case’ if the same question 
would come up before it anew.76 
Given this background, it is possible, perhaps even probable, that the Supreme Court 
asks itself how much there really is to gain from a preliminary reference to the EFTA Court 
and if the advantages outweigh the delay, work and cost entailed.   
A related explanation for the low number of requests from Norwegian courts is the in-
terests of the parties appearing before the national court. Even though there are several cases 
in which a (private) party has pleaded for a reference to be made, it is perhaps even more 
striking that this seems not have been the case in the majority of the abovementioned cases. It 
is certainly tempting to speculate that parties (and interveners) with an interest in a more gen-
eral clarification of EU and EEA law, such as, e.g., The Norwegian Competition Authority in 
Tine or The Norwegian Consumer Council and The Federation of Norwegian Commercial 
and Service Enterprises as interveners on each their side in the “boot heel-case”, would be 
keener on preliminary references if the recipient was the ECJ rather than the EFTA Court.   
In cases against the state in which the private party nonetheless do ask for a prelimi-
nary reference to be made, the mostly firm opposition to any such suggestion from the Nor-
wegian Attorney General for Civil Affairs has to be taken into account as a contributing fac-
tor.77 Even though the decision of Borgarting Court of Appeal in Gaming Machines shows 
that even agreement among the parties need not be sufficient, the number of Norwegian refer-
rals would surely be higher if the Government lawyers were to support rather than to oppose 
such pleas. However, with Fokus Bank and, reportedly, also Slinning, Rindal and, at least par-
tially, Nguyen as commendable exceptions, most preliminary references are made against the 
                                                 
75
 Bull, cited supra note 54, at 111. 
76
 Rt. 2010 p. 1500, paragraph 113. 
77
 Cf. Bull, cited supra note 54, at 113. 
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advice of the Attorney General. The usual argument put forward by the Government lawyers 
is that the competence of the EFTA Court under Article 34 SCA is limited to the general in-
terpretation of EEA law whereas the case at hand typically raises questions of application of 
EEA law only, thereby implying that the EFTA Court will be unable to offer more detailed 
guidelines than those already found in ECJ case law. Apparently, it was this line of argument 
which convinced the Supreme Court not to request an advisory opinion in Gaming Machines. 
The fact that the EFTA Court and the ECJ both clearly draw the distinction between interpre-
tation and application differently, arguably stretching the notion of ‘interpretation’ in order to 
provide the referring court or tribunal with a truly helpful answer, is apparently disregarded as 
examples of the two EEA courts usurping competences which belong to the national courts.78 
As stated by Henrik Bull, it is tempting to speculate that the Attorney General hopes 
that his arguments in favour of the Government’s position would be more persuasive in the 
ears of Norwegian judges who are not themselves experts in EEA law, than in the ears of 
judges in Luxembourg.79 However, if this is indeed the case, it is of even greater importance 
to underscore that the survey of the application of EEA law in Norwegian courts offers very 
little support for any suggestion that such a strategy is succeeding – Norwegian courts do keep 
cases to themselves, but apparently not in order to avvoid unwelcome answers from the EFTA 
Court.80 
 
VI. Assessing the Supreme Court’s approach 
As far as the reception of ECJ and EFTA Court case law is concerned, the open and EEA-
friendly approach of the Supreme Court merit praise. As to its relationship to the latter court, 
however, the persistent lack of referrals is, it is submitted, highly unfortunate. 
As to the possible reasons set out above, none of them appears sufficient to justify the 
current situation. The delay, work and cost entailed with a preliminary reference should at 
least be disregarded in situations in which the parties appearing before a Norwegian court ask 
for a request to be made. In cases against the state, the willingness of the private party to 
await an answer from the EFTA Court and, if need be, to pay the extra costs, should be suffi-
                                                 
78
 Accordingly, in cases where a Norwegian court nonetheless decide to request an advisory opinion, the Attor-
ney General will regularly argue for the questions to be worded in very general terms. And further, once before 
the EFTA Court, the Government will remind the Court of its limited competences under Article 34 SCA, see, 
most recently, the Norwegian Governments observations in Case E-2/10 Kolbeinsson [2009-2010] EFTA Court 
Report 234 (as summarised in paragraph 76 of the Report for the Hearing) and Case E-16/10 Philip Morris Nor-
way, judgment 12.9.2011 (nyr), para.58.  
79
 Bull, cited supra note 54, at 113. 
80
 Cf. the (general) allegation made by Carl Baudenbacher, ‘The EFTA Court in Action’, Stuttgart 2010, at p. 
24. 
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cient to eliminate this argument. Further, the principle of proportionality as an inherent part of 
Norwegian civil procedure ought to be understood in an EEA-friendly manner. Actually, pro-
portionality could be invoked in favour of a reference being made already by the first instance 
court, thereby possibly removing the need for a time consuming and costly appeal to the 
Court of Appeal (or even further to the Supreme Court). In any case, particular attention 
should be brought to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Pafitis and oth-
ers v Greece, in which the Strasbourg court held that the period of time spent on a preliminary 
reference to the ECJ is to be disregarded in the assessment of whether the national proceed-
ings is concluded within a reasonable time as guaranteed under Article 6 (1) ECHR.81 It may 
be inferred from this judgment that the goal of efficient justice may not be used as an argu-
ment against a preliminary reference, be it to the ECJ or to the EFTA Court.82 
Further, as far as the usefulness of an advisory opinion is concerned, it is submitted 
that this is, on average, far bigger than the few cases brought before the Supreme Court may 
have lead the latter to think. It is a unavoidable consequence of the national court system that 
the cases ultimately brought before the Supreme Court are the ones where it either appears 
questionable whether the EFTA Court really got it right or where the case is of such a charac-
ter that all the EFTA Court could do was to offer some guidelines to the national courts (typi-
cally in cases depending upon concrete application of the proportionality principle). Thus, the 
majority of cases where the answer received from the EFTA Court is such that there is not 
much left to say (see infra section II) are never brought to the attention of the Supreme Court.  
Somewhat paradoxically, the best line of arguments in favour of a preliminary refer-
ence to the EFTA Court is the one offered by the full Supreme Court itself when explaining 
why EFTA Court case law ought to be given ‘significant weight’ (see infra section II). 
Quite possibly, the Supreme Court would prefer to have direct access to the ECJ, ena-
bling it to participate more directly in the ‘judicial dialogue’ through which EU and EEA law 
evolves. However, given that it seems neither constitutionally nor politically possible for 
Norway to submit to the jurisdiction of the ’foreign judges’ of the ECJ under Article 107 
EEA,83 the Supreme Court ought to recognise that its only possibility to have its voice heard 
on the European stage currently, and for the forseeable future, runs through requests to the 
EFTA Court for advisory opinions.      
                                                 
81
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Further still, it should not be overlooked that a reference to the EFTA Court may func-
tion as a sort of insurance against possible reactions in cases in which a Norwegian court is in 
doubt as to the proper the interpretation of EEA law. At worst, misapplication of EEA law 
may lead to an infringement action being brought before the EFTA Court by the EFTA Sur-
veillance Authority or to a claim against the state for damages. As to the former, a defeat in an 
infringement action brought about by a Norwegian court decision may under Norwegian pro-
cedural law lead to the reopening of the case.84 As to the latter, the conscious decision not to 
refer in a situation in which the national court itself acknowledges that it is uncertain about 
the correct interpretation of EEA law, certainly has to be taken into account when assessing 
whether a breach of EEA law committed by a national court is to be regarded as sufficiently 
serious to entail liability for the State in question.85  
True enough, the Supreme Court may object that its track record in the field of EEA 
law is a fine one and that essentially what matters to economic operators doing business in 
Norway is that their EEA rights are adequately protected, not in which court judicial protec-
tion is offered. Still, as is well known, justice has not only to be done, it has to be seen to be 
done. In the EEA setting, this general statement may be understood as to encompass not only 
the perspective of private parties, but also the perspective of other Contracting Parties to the 
EEA Agreement. From this perspective, it is submitted, the Norwegian Supreme Court ought 
to acknowledge that it may still matter in a broader context whether judicial protection is of-
fered in Norwegian courts alone or in cooperation with the EFTA Court: Perhaps not so much 
for the parties in the concrete case, but for the continued success of the EEA Agreement. 
From the perspective of the ECJ, the EFTA Court has proved to be a reliable and 
independent guarantor of the EFTA States’ fulfilment of their obligations under the 
Agreement.86 Under the principle of reciprocity referred to in the fourth recital in the 
preamble of the EEA Agreement, this may impact upon the ECJ’s contined willingness to 
grant market operators from the EFTA States the same rights as their EU competitors. Having 
studied the development in ECJ’s approach to EEA law from the deep scepticism voiced in 
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Opinion 1/91 and, albeit to a lesser extent, in Opinion 1/92, through a phase of apparent sof-
tening (and, possibly, internal discussion) to gradual recognition of the possibility to realise 
the Agreement’s objective to extend the internal market to the EFTA States, I am of the firm 
belief that the EFTA Court’s dynamic and integration friendly interpretation of EEA law has 
been a contributory factor of significant importance.87 
Thus, even if the Supreme Court may be right in its apparent assessment of its own 
capability to predict the development in ECJ case law with the same accuracy as does the 
EFTA Court (although this may be questioned, not least due to the EFTA Court’s expert 
knowledge of EEA law and to the rules of procedure opening up for input from the Commis-
sion, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EEA Member States), it is difficult for the 
other Contracting Parties (and the ECJ) to assess for themselves whether this is (and remains 
to be) the case. The position of the EFTA Court now appears to be of such a nature that even 
in a hypothetical case in which it ends up accepting national restrictions on the fundamental 
freedoms of the EEA Agreement which should have been disallowed pursuant to subsequent 
ECJ case law, no one will suspect it of wilful contribution to the feared ‘cherry picking’ of the 
EFTA States. By contrast, the ‘margin of error’ of the Supreme Court of Norway is probably 
of a more limited nature – rightly or wrongly, there is something slightly suspicious about a 




Even more than 18 years after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, the relationship 
between the EFTA Court and the Supreme Court of Norway has yet to find its form. Appar-
ently, there is at present some disagreement within the Supreme Court as to its attitude to-
wards the EFTA Court.88 Interestingly, there is currently an unprecedented generation change 
at the Supreme Court: Out of the 20 current justices of the court, thirteen has been appointed 
in the last six years (of which nine in the last three years!). Out of the thirteen justices decid-
ing the Finanger (No. II) case in 2005, only five are still at the Court. Further, it is noteworthy 
that the Supreme Court only in 2011 got it first member with an EEA law background when 
the former Norwegian judge at the EFTA Court, Henrik Bull, was appointed to the bench.  
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It remains to be seen if the many new justices will bring about changes. If not, it may 
be argued that the legislator ought to intervene. However, this is likely to bring up difficult 
constitutional and political questions as to the Supreme Court’s relationship to the two EEA 
Courts.  
From the perspective of homogeneity, there is no denial that the best solution would 
be to open up for preliminary references to the ECJ under Article 107 EEA. To the EU, this 
would be the ultimate proof of the willingness of Norway and its courts to play by the rules of 
the internal market, whereas it from the perspective of the Supreme Court would grant direct 
access to the institution entrusted with the last word on the interpretation and judicial devel-
opment of the internal market acquis to which Norway is subject. Still, if limited to a mere 
possibility to turn to the ECJ, it might be feared that the much longer delay caused by a pre-
liminary reference to the ECJ (as compared to one to the EFTA Court) will limit Norwegian 
courts’ use of Article 107 EEA considerably. Further, in a situation where the EFTA Court 
would retain competence in all direct actions (including infringement actions against Norway) 
as well as to answer request for advisory opinions from Lichtenstein and Icelandic courts, one 
would still have to live with the immanent possibility of conflicting case law. And further 
still, it has to be taken into account that use of Article 107 EEA would represent a huge blow 
to the EFTA Court which could have unforeseen consequences for a complex judicial archi-
tecture which after all seems to be working remarkably well. In any case, and even omitting 
the controversial question whether Articles 88 and 90 of the Norwegian constitution would 
allow for binding judgments from the ‘foreign judges’ of the ECJ,89 the Norwegian govern-
ment has made very clear that use of Article 107 EEA is out of the question for political rea-
sons alone.90 
In the alternative, the legislator could introduce procedural provisions forcing Norwe-
gian courts to reconsider their relationship to the EFTA Court. A gentle version would be the 
introduction of an obligation to at least give reasons when rejecting petitions for a preliminary 
reference, preferably with clarification in the travaux préparatoires as to the effect that the 
principle of procedural proportionality is not to be understood as a hindrance towards the use 
of Article 34 SCA. Further, it would probably be helpful if the legislator was to state in gen-
eral that Norwegian courts ought to contribute to the EFTA Court getting a sufficient number 
of cases in order to fulfil its role as guarantor of the EFTA States’ fulfilment of their EEA 
                                                 
89
 See on this Fredriksen, Europäische Vorlageverfahren und nationales Zivilprozessrecht, cited supra note 10, at 
74 ff. 
90
 See the assessment of the Government on the occasion of the Norwegian parliament’s ratification of the EEA 
Agreement; Royal Proposition No. 100 (1991-1992), at p. 340. 
 24
obligations. If this proves insufficient to raise the number of references, the possibility of in-
troducing an obligation to refer unresolved questions of EEA law to the EFTA Court would 
be the last resort.91 As long as the answers received from the EFTA Court are not formally 
binding, there seems to be no constitutional hindrance towards such an obligation. Still, the 
introduction of an obligation to cooperate with the EFTA Court would hardly be welcomed by 
the Supreme Court and would as such be a rather sensitive matter. A far less radical, but prob-
ably just as effective solution would quite simply be for the Norwegian government to recon-
sider its present opposition to preliminary references to the EFTA Court. 
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